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Note 
Pharmacist Refusals: Dispensing (With) Religious 
Accommodation Under Title VII 
Amy Bergquist∗ 
On Saturday, July 6, 2002, Amanda Renz, a student at the 
University of Wisconsin-Stout,1 entered the K-Mart pharmacy 
in Menomonie, Wisconsin, to refill her prescription for Loestrin 
FE 1/20, an oral contraceptive.2 Renz planned to take the first 
dose of the refill the next day,3 and if she were to miss this 
dose, she would need to use a substitute form of birth control 
for an entire month.4 Neil Noesen, a Roman Catholic, was the 
only pharmacist on duty at the pharmacy that weekend.5 He 
told her that he would not refill her prescription because he ob-
jected to contraceptives on religious grounds.6 Renz asked Noe-
sen where she could go to have her prescription refilled, but he 
refused to tell her because he did not want to participate in her 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1991, 
Amherst College. The author thanks Robyn Madson for sharing her story; Jo-
seph Schmitt and Ryan Stai for topic selection advice; Suzanne Thorpe for re-
search assistance; Professor Stephen Befort for substantive feedback on an 
earlier draft; Professors Laura Cooper and David Weissbrodt for serving as 
mentors; the board and staff of volume 90 of the Minnesota Law Review for 
their diligence, thoughtful advice, and commitment to a valuable collective en-
deavor; and Erik Larson for everything else. 
 1. See Stacy Forster, Pharmacist Rebuked: He Refused to Refill Birth 
Control Prescription, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 14, 2005, at 1 (referring 
to Renz by her married name, Amanda Phiede). This story is also described in 
Holly Teliska, Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Under-
mine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 
BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 229, 229 (2005). 
 2. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Noesen, No. 01 PHM 080, 
paras. 21–22 (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr. 13, 2005), https://drl.wi.gov/ 
dept/decisions/docs/0405070.htm. The court documents refer to the woman as 
“AR.” See id. para. 21. 
 3. See id. para. 24. 
 4. See id. paras. 42, 44–45. 
 5. See id. paras. 21, 32. 
 6. Id. paras. 25–26. 
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efforts to receive contraceptives.7 She went to another phar-
macy and the pharmacist there attempted to have the prescrip-
tion transferred by telephone, but Noesen refused to provide 
the necessary information.8 Renz went home and telephoned 
the assistant store manager, who reported that the store had 
been having many problems that day because women were un-
able to fill their prescriptions.9 The pharmacy did not fill Renz’s 
prescription until Monday, July 8.10 
Reported incidents of pharmacists refusing to dispense 
contraceptives or other prescription medication on religious 
grounds are escalating;11 according to one estimate there were 
180 refusals nationwide in a six-month period in 2004.12 These 
refusals have sparked a national debate about healthcare ac-
cess, professional ethics, and the definition of abortion.13 Yet 
commentators have devoted little attention to the employment 
law governing pharmacist refusals.14 
As private employers, pharmacies may elect to accommo-
date the religious beliefs of pharmacists, and a variety of fac-
tors may influence this decision. The acute shortage of pharma-
cists15 may provide an incentive for employers to defer to 
 
 7. See id. para. 28. 
 8. See id. paras. 29–31, 33. 
 9. See id. para. 34. 
 10. Id. para. 43. 
 11. See Rene Sanchez, New Arena for Birth-Control Battle, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), May 3, 2005, at A1; Rob Stein, Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of 
New Debate: Because of Beliefs, Some Refuse to Fill Birth Control Prescrip-
tions, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at A1. 
 12. See Editorial, Moralists at the Pharmacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, 
§ 4, at 12. 
 13. See, e.g., Rachel Benson Gold, The Implications of Defining When a 
Woman Is Pregnant, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, May 2005, at 7, 10 
(reporting that the debate has drawn renewed attention to the issue of when 
pregnancy begins and what constitutes an abortion); Adam Sonfield, Rights vs. 
Responsibilities: Professional Standards and Provider Refusals, GUTTMACHER 
REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Aug. 2005, at 7, 7 (observing that issues at stake include 
pharmacists’ rights, legal and ethical obligations, and discrimination in health 
care access). 
 14. Scholars have focused on health care access issues and state refusal 
clauses. See, e.g., Donald W. Herbe, Note, The Right to Refuse: A Call for Ade-
quate Protection of a Pharmacist’s Right to Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and 
Emergency Contraception, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 77, 89 (2002) (noting briefly the 
“employment ramifications” of pharmacist refusals); Teliska, supra note 1, at 
240–41 (criticizing pharmacist refusal clauses for their effect on access to 
health care). 
 15. See Shortage of Pharmacists Takes a Turn for the Worse, CHAIN DRUG 
REV. (N.Y.), June 6, 2005, at 246 [hereinafter Shortage of Pharmacists] (dis-
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employees’ religious accommodation requests.16 Some religious 
organizations may encourage and support pharmacists who re-
fuse to dispense contraceptives and the pharmacies that ac-
commodate them.17 Facing steep competition from mail-order 
drug providers,18 retail pharmacies seek to emphasize their 
ability to provide comprehensive customer service and demon-
strate their superiority over more impersonal alternatives.19 
Independent retail pharmacies, which depend heavily on walk-
in business,20 may encounter intense economic pressure to en-
sure that pharmacists fill every prescription without delay.21 
Some major drug store chains insist that Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act obliges them to accommodate pharmacists who 
refuse to dispense on religious grounds.22 In spite of these 
 
cussing a sharp rise in pharmacist vacancies in retail pharmacies). 
 16. See The Early Show: Karen Brauer, Fired Pharmacist and Gloria 
Feldt of Planned Parenthood, Discuss Their Beliefs on Pharmacies Filling Pre-
scriptions for Birth Control Pills (CBS television broadcast Apr. 23, 2001), 
available at 2006 LEXIS ALLNWS (“[I]t would be helpful [for pharmacies] to 
be practical. There’s now a shortage of pharmacists. . . . There seem to be not 
enough pro-choice medical professionals to fulfill the needs or demands of cer-
tain women . . . .” (statement of Karen Brauer, chapter leader of Ohio Pharma-
cists for Life)). 
 17. See Teliska, supra note 1, at 246 (observing that religious groups are 
organizing efforts to monitor and support pharmacist refusals); Moralists at 
the Pharmacy, supra note 12 (“[I]f this movement picks up steam, right-to-life 
groups in some areas may pressure one pharmacy after another to refuse ser-
vice . . . .”); cf. Florence A. Ruderman, Editorial, Prescription for Injustice, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A23 (“[O]ther pharmacists may be unwilling to fill 
contested prescriptions, out of fear of becoming targets for boycotts or other 
hostile actions.”). 
 18. See Milt Freudenheim, Drugstores Fret as Insurers Demand Pills by 
Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A1 (discussing the effects of insurers requir-
ing consumers to fill their prescriptions by mail). 
 19. See Michael Johnsen, Can Pharmacists Dispense Morality?, DRUG 
STORE NEWS (N.Y.), Mar. 21, 2005, at 1 (“[T]he chain drug operator . . . has a 
vested interest in establishing and maintaining a customer-friendly policy in 
what has become an extremely competitive environment.”); ‘Prevent the Switch 
in the First Place,’ CHAIN DRUG REV. (N.Y.), May 2, 2005, at 226 (reporting 
that customers prefer retail pharmacies over mail-order suppliers “because of 
the convenience and the personal relationship they can build with their local 
pharmacist”). 
 20. See ‘Prevent the Switch in the First Place,’ supra note 19, at 226. 
 21. See Joan E. Allen, New Battleground, CHI. TRIB., May 28, 1997, at 7 
(“As an independent pharmacist, you do things above and beyond what a chain 
would do.” (quoting Richard E. Kane, the owner of an independent pharmacy)). 
 22. See, e.g., CVS Sees Its Job as Filling Every Script, CHAIN DRUG REV. 
(N.Y.), Aug. 29, 2005, at 1 (noting that CVS senior vice president of store op-
erations made reference to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in describing the com-
pany’s policy, which allows pharmacists to refuse to fill contraceptive prescrip-
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claims, the only prominent case in which a pharmacist chal-
lenged her termination for refusing to dispense birth control 
was dismissed after the employer went bankrupt,23 and courts 
have issued “no significant verdicts or appellate decisions on 
the subject so far.”24 In 2004 and 2005, several employers re-
portedly fired pharmacists for refusing to fill prescriptions.25 As 
those former employees consider suing,26 and as pharmacists 
more frequently refuse to fill prescriptions on religious 
grounds,27 it is imperative to determine the extent to which Ti-
tle VII protects pharmacist refusals.28 May a pharmacy termi-
nate a refusing pharmacist? Could K-Mart dismiss Noesen for 
his refusal to fill Renz’s prescription, or would that termination 
violate Title VII? 
Women are using emergency contraception more fre-
quently,29 and therefore the issue of pharmacist refusals takes 
 
tions “as long as they make certain the customer can receive the medication 
when another pharmacist is on duty or at another CVS store”); Planned Par-
enthood Fed’n of Am., What’s the Matter with Target’s Response, 
http://www.saveroe.com/target/response (last visited Mar. 5, 2006 (quoting a 
Nov. 14, 2005 e-mail from Target suggesting that the company’s policy of al-
lowing objecting pharmacists to transfer Plan B emergency contraception pre-
scriptions to a different pharmacy is required by Title VII). 
 23. See Brauer v. K-Mart Corp., Civ. Action No. C-1-99-618 (S.D. Ohio 
Sept. 30, 2004) (order to close case administratively); see also ‘Morning After’ 
Misery, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 6, 1999, at B2 (reporting the pharmacist’s reasons for 
filing the lawsuit). 
 24. Correy E. Stephenson, Coming Soon to a Court Near You: Conscience 
Clauses, LAW. WKLY., Apr. 25, 2005, at 1. 
 25. See Steve Barnes, Pharmacists Fired, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at 
A18 (reporting that Eckerd Corporation fired three Texas pharmacists for re-
fusing to fill a prescription); Sanchez, supra note 11 (observing that Neil Noe-
sen was fired from a Snyders drug store for allegedly refusing to fill birth con-
trol prescriptions). 
 26. According to one source, “[l]egal action [regarding pharmacist refus-
als] is still in the formative stages, with several cases pending.” Stephenson, 
supra note 24; see also Jo Mannies, ‘Pill’ Dispute Costs Pharmacist Her Job, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2006, at A1 (reporting that in January 
2006, one attorney initiated an EEOC complaint and a civil suit on behalf of 
four terminated pharmacists). 
 27. See Sanchez, supra note 11 (indicating that incidents of pharmacists 
declining to fill contraceptive prescriptions are on the rise); see also Stein, su-
pra note 11 (quoting a representative of the Christian Legal Society’s Center 
for Law and Religious Freedom who stated that the issue is “just beginning to 
surface” and that the organization is “on the very front edge of a wave that’s 
going to break not too far down the line”). 
 28. See Johnsen, supra note 19 (noting that the issue “represents a poten-
tial legal powder keg for pharmacy employers”). 
 29. See Rachel K. Jones et al., Contraceptive Use Among U.S. Women Hav-
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on greater urgency. Because some pharmacists consider emer-
gency contraception to be an abortifacient, they are more likely 
to refuse to fill prescriptions for the drug.30 Moreover, the time-
sensitive nature of the drug31 means that pharmacist refusals 
may directly harm consumers.32 The FDA’s continued and con-
troversial denial of drug manufacturers’ requests to make 
emergency contraception available without a prescription33 en-
sures that women will continue to depend on pharmacists to 
obtain those drugs quickly and easily.34 
This Note demonstrates that pharmacies are required to 
make only minimal accommodations for pharmacists who re-
fuse to dispense certain drugs on religious grounds. Part I out-
lines the statutory requirements of religious accommodation 
under Title VII, and then describes the landmark Supreme 
Court cases interpreting those statutory requirements. Part II 
argues that nearly any attempt to accommodate refusing 
pharmacists would either be unreasonable or constitute an un-
due hardship on employers. Pharmacist refusals differ from 
other employment contexts warranting religious accommoda-
tion because refusals frequently deny service to customers and 
therefore cause employers to lose business. Congress did not 
envision, and court precedents do not interpret, Title VII to ob-
 
ing Abortions in 2000–2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 294, 
300 (2002). 
 30. See Teliska, supra note 1, at 235; Carol Ukens, Conscience vs. Patient 
Rights: R.Ph.’s Refusal to Dispense Stirs Up Controversy, DRUG TOPICS, May 
19, 1997, at 38. 
 31. See Task Force on Postovulatory Methods of Fertility Regulation, 
World Health Org., Randomised Controlled Trial of Levonorgestrel Versus the 
Yuzpe Regimen of Combined Oral Contraceptives for Emergency Contraception, 
352 LANCET 428, 432 (1998) (discussing the inverse relationship between 
pregnancy rates and the time from unprotected intercourse to treatment with 
emergency contraceptives). 
 32. See Heather Boonstra, Emergency Contraception: Steps Being Taken to 
Improve Access, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Dec. 2002, at 10, 10–11. 
 33. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-109, FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION: DECISION PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR 
OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETING OF THE EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG 
PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL 19–30 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new 
.items/d06109.pdf. 
 34. See Herbe, supra note 14, at 81–82 (observing that FDA approval of 
over-the-counter status for emergency contraception is “not likely in today’s 
political climate”); see also James Trussel et al., Access to Emergency Contra-
ception, 95 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 267, 269 (concluding that the need for 
prompt treatment “presents a great challenge for women, who must find pro-
viders who will prescribe the pills and do so immediately”). 
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ligate pharmacies to accommodate pharmacists who refuse to 
perform essential job duties. This Note concludes that although 
pharmacies are not required to make significant accommoda-
tions for refusing pharmacists, labor-market forces may compel 
employers to make generous accommodations and then to use 
Title VII as a pretense to justify those accommodations when 
customers complain that they are denied access to prescription 
drugs. 
I.  TITLE VII AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
Absent legislation, the federal government has little influ-
ence over employment policies relating to religion. The First 
Amendment constrains government employers,35 but it has a 
negligible effect on the policies of private employers.36 As dem-
onstrated below, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act restricts both 
private and public employers’ right to terminate, discipline, or 
refuse to hire employees on religious grounds.37 
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196438 
to combat discriminatory employment practices.39 The initial 
legislation prohibited employment discrimination on the basis 
of religion.40 Section 701(j) of the 1972 amendments to the Civil 
 
 35. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) 
(extending First Amendment prohibitions on laws inhibiting free exercise of 
religion to acts of state governments). But see James M. Oleske, Jr., Federal-
ism, Free Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering Reasonable Accommodation, 6 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 525 (2004) (arguing that Title VII is vulnerable to chal-
lenge on First Amendment and state sovereign immunity grounds). 
 36. See Josh Schopf, Religious Activity and Proselytization in the Work-
place: The Murky Line Between Healthy Expression and Unlawful Harass-
ment, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 39, 52 n.93 (1997) (“Private employers do 
not have the same First Amendment concerns as their government counter-
parts.”). 
 37. See also Ken Nakasu Davison, Comment, The Mixed-Race Experience: 
Treatment of Racially Miscategorized Individuals Under Title VII, 12 ASIAN 
L.J. 161, 165–66 (2005) (noting that Title VII regulates both public and pri-
vate employers). 
 38. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 
253–66 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-15 (2000)). 
 39. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2355, 2401. 
 40. § 703(a), 78 Stat. at 255, (“It shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his . . . 
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Rights Act41 responded to judicial interpretation of the 1964 
provision42 and incorporated guidelines developed by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).43 Section 701(j) 
clarified that religion “includes all aspects of religious obser-
vance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer dem-
onstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or 
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer’s business.”44 
The legislative history of section 701(j) is sparse.45 West 
Virginia Senator Jennings Randolph, a Seventh-Day Baptist,46 
proposed the measure, expressing the need “to assure that 
freedom from religious discrimination in the employment of 
workers is for all time guaranteed by law.”47 Senator 
Randolph’s advocacy of the amendment on the Senate floor fo-
cused on the religious needs of individuals who “believe there 
should be a steadfast observance of the Sabbath and require 
that the observance of the day of worship, the day of the Sab-
bath, be other than on Sunday.”48 He included in the record re-
prints of two court decisions interpreting EEOC guidelines re-
garding employers’ obligations to accommodate the religious 
beliefs and practices of employees.49 In fielding brief questions 
from two senators about the extent of the burden imposed on 
employers under the amendment, Senator Randolph agreed 
 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion . . . .”). 
 41. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 
§ 701(j), 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). 
 42. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330–31 (1970), aff ’d 
by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. 
Supp. 583, 584 (M.D. Fla. 1971); LEX K. LARSON, 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION § 56.01 (2d ed. 2005). 
 43. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967). 
 44. § 701(j), 86 Stat at 103. 
 45. See 118 CONG. REC. 705–31 (1972); see also Trans World Airlines v. 
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“The brief legislative history of § 701(j) is 
likewise of little assistance in [determining the degree of accommodation that 
is required of an employer].”). Of the twenty-seven pages in the Congressional 
Record devoted to the amendment, only the first two involve floor debate of the 
proposal; the remainder consists of “the cases and regulations which are appli-
cable to th[e] issue.” 118 CONG. REC. 706. 
 46. 118 CONG. REC. 705. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 706–13 (reprinting Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 
(6th Cir. 1970), and Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971)). 
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that the provisions would not require an employer to “close 
down” its operations in order to accommodate the needs of an 
employee to observe a Sabbath, and noted that there would 
perhaps be “a very, very small percentage of cases” in which an 
employer and employee could not reach a voluntary arrange-
ment.50 
The Senate adopted the Randolph amendment with a 55–0 
vote.51 The Supreme Court later noted that the language of the 
amendment and the legislative record demonstrate that Con-
gress intended to require employers to make some effort at ac-
commodation, but the Court also observed that Congress failed 
to provide guidance with respect to “how much an employer 
must do to satisfy its statutory obligation.”52 
B. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE VII 
The Supreme Court has articulated two prongs of analysis 
for an employer’s defense against allegations of religious dis-
crimination.53 First, an employer may attempt to provide a rea-
sonable accommodation to an employee’s religious needs.54 At 
this stage, the analysis hinges on whether the accommodation 
is reasonable to the employee.55 If the employer offers an ac-
commodation that is reasonable, it has fulfilled its obligations 
under section 701(j), and no further examination is necessary.56 
If, however, the employer asserts that it is unable to offer any 
reasonable accommodation, the second prong of analysis re-
quires an employer to demonstrate that any reasonable ac-
commodation would present an undue hardship.57 If the em-
ployer can prove undue hardship for every reasonable 
accommodation, it does not need to accommodate an em-
ployee.58 Two Supreme Court cases piece together this analysis. 
 
 50. Id. at 706. 
 51. Id. at 730–31. There is no record of abstentions; evidently many sena-
tors were absent at the time of the vote. See id. 
 52. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 n.9 (1977); 
see also Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 
772, 775 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“The ‘reach’ of the obligation has simply 
never been spelled out by Congress or the EEOC.”). 
 53. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986). 
 54. See id. at 68, 70. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. at 68–69. 
 58. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977). 
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The Supreme Court first interpreted section 701(j) in 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.59 Trans World Airlines 
(TWA) employee Larry Hardison worked at a site that was 
open twenty-four hours a day, and a collective-bargaining 
agreement governed his employment.60 Pursuant to that 
agreement, Hardison’s union implemented a seniority system 
for assigning shifts.61 During his employment with TWA, Hard-
ison converted to a religious sect prohibiting work from sunset 
on Friday to sunset on Saturday and informed his manager of 
his beliefs.62 Hardison lacked seniority to bid successfully for a 
shift that would correspond with his religious needs.63 Reject-
ing the first prong of analysis, TWA argued that it was unable 
to provide any reasonable accommodation; all of the accommo-
dations that Hardison proposed constituted an undue hard-
ship.64 The union refused to violate seniority provisions and 
TWA rejected Hardison’s proposal that he work only four days 
a week.65 The Court outlined the burdens imposed by Hardi-
son’s three proposed accommodations: 
Hardison’s job was essential and on weekends he was the only avail-
able person on his shift to perform it. To leave the position empty 
would have impaired supply shop functions, which were critical to air-
line operations; to fill Hardison’s position with a supervisor or an em-
ployee from another area would simply have undermanned another 
operation; and to employ someone not regularly assigned to work 
Saturdays would have required TWA to pay premium wages.66 
TWA ultimately discharged Hardison on grounds of insub-
ordination for refusing to work his Saturday shifts, and Hardi-
son responded by filing suit against TWA and the union, alleg-
ing that his discharge violated Title VII.67 
 
 59. See id. at 74. The events at issue occurred prior to enactment of the 
1972 amendments, but the Court acknowledged that the EEOC regulations 
that were then in place included the same requirement for “reasonable ac-
commodations” unless they would cause “undue hardship” for an employer. Id. 
at 66. The Court granted deference to the EEOC regulations because Congress 
had ratified the EEOC religious accommodation provisions in the 1972 
amendments. See id. at 76 n.11. 
 60. See id. at 66–67. 
 61. See id. at 67. 
 62. See id. at 67–68. 
 63. See id. at 68. 
 64. See id. at 68–69; Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 
(1986) (“The employer in Hardison simply argued that all conceivable accom-
modations would result in undue hardship . . . .”). 
 65. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 68–69. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 69. 
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The Supreme Court focused on the second prong of the sec-
tion 701(j) analysis.68 It examined the three proposed accom-
modations (leaving the position empty, having a supervisor or 
coworker from another area fill in, and hiring an additional 
person to work Saturdays) and determined that each would 
have been an undue hardship.69 The Court noted that because 
the employer needed some employees to be on duty on week-
ends, there were two alternatives to determine who would be 
required to work weekend shifts: 
[A]dopt a neutral system, such as seniority, . . . or allocate days off in 
accordance with the religious needs of [TWA’s] employees . . . . There 
were no volunteers to relieve Hardison on Saturdays, and to give 
Hardison Saturdays off, TWA would have had to deprive another em-
ployee of his shift preference at least in part because he did not ad-
here to a religion that observed the Saturday Sabbath. 
  Title VII does not contemplate such unequal treatment . . . . It 
would be anomalous to conclude that by “reasonable accommodation” 
Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job prefer-
ence of some employees . . . in order to accommodate or prefer the re-
ligious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII does not re-
quire an employer to go that far.70 
The Court determined that the proposed accommodations 
“would involve costs to TWA, either in the form of lost efficiency 
in other jobs or higher wages” and held that because those ac-
commodations would “require TWA to bear more than a de 
minimis cost,” they would constitute an undue hardship.71 
In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook,72 the Supreme 
Court examined an employer’s obligations under section 701(j) 
to accommodate a high school teacher who sought leave for re-
ligious observances.73 The Court focused primarily on the first 
prong of analysis: the reasonableness of the proposed accom-
modations.74 The teacher proposed two accommodations,75 and 
the employer offered an accommodation of its own.76 The Court 
 
 68. See id. at 78–81 (noting that TWA was not required to violate its col-
lective-bargaining agreement to effect a shift swap and that the other accom-
modations would impose an undue hardship on the employer). 
 69. See id. at 81–85. 
 70. Id. at 80–81. 
 71. See id. at 84–85. 
 72. 479 U.S. 60 (1986). 
 73. See id. at 63. 
 74. See id. at 67–71. 
 75. See id. at 64–65. 
 76. See id. at 70 (“We think that the school board policy in this case, re-
quiring respondent to take unpaid leave for holy day observance that exceeded 
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held that the employer was not obligated to accept the em-
ployee’s proposed accommodations because “[b]y its very terms 
the statute directs that any reasonable accommodation by the 
employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation.”77 
Therefore, as long as an employer proposes at least one reason-
able accommodation, it fulfills its obligations under section 
701(j).78 Courts must consider the extent of the hardship only if 
an employer “claims that it is unable to offer any reasonable 
accommodation without [undue] hardship,”79 as in Hardison. 
The Court then examined the employer’s accommodation to 
determine whether it was reasonable.80 It found that the school 
board policy requiring the teacher to take unpaid leave for reli-
gious observances was likely reasonable.81 But the Court 
warned that such an accommodation would be unreasonable if 
“paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones,” 
arguing that this arrangement would constitute discrimination 
against religious practices.82 
The Supreme Court has therefore articulated two prongs of 
analysis for an employer’s defense against charges of religious 
discrimination under section 701(j). Hardison examines situa-
tions in which any accommodation would present an undue 
hardship, emphasizing the second prong of the analysis and 
holding that anything more than a “de minimis cost” would 
constitute an undue hardship.83 Ansonia sketches out the re-
mainder of the analysis. First, it articulates the relationship 
between section 701(j)’s reasonable accommodation and undue 
hardship clauses, noting that if an employer offers one reason-
able accommodation, courts need not examine the hardship of 
alternative accommodations.84 Additionally, it clarifies the first 
prong’s standard for reasonableness, suggesting that an ac-
commodation may be reasonable even if it requires an employee 
to incur financial costs, but not if it allows more flexibility for 
 
the amount allowed by the collective-bargaining agreement, would generally 
be a reasonable one.”). 
 77. Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
 78. See id. at 68–69. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 70–71. 
 81. See id. at 70. 
 82. See id. at 71 (remanding for a factual determination of the reason-
ableness of the accommodation). 
 83. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977). 
 84. See Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68–69. 
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nonreligious accommodations than for religious accommoda-
tions.85 Both cases implicitly support the conclusion that the 
reasonable accommodation analysis properly focuses on the 
employee, rather than on the employer; the undue hardship 
prong examines considerations of fairness to the employer.86 
The following analysis will consider these two prongs in se-
quence. 
II.  PHARMACIST REFUSALS UNDER TITLE VII 
Demonstrating a violation of Title VII’s religious accom-
modation provision is a two-step process.87 First, the employee 
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.88 To do 
this, the employee must demonstrate a sincerely held religious 
belief which interferes with an employment requirement, and 
then must show that the employer discharged or disciplined the 
employee89 for failure to comply with the requirement.90 This 
Note presumes that a refusing pharmacist who is terminated or 
disciplined is able to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion and focuses on the two-prong analysis articulated in Hard-
ison and Ansonia to determine whether Title VII is violated. 
Once the employee establishes a prima facie case of reli-
gious discrimination, the employer must demonstrate that it 
has met its burdens under Title VII by making a good faith ef-
fort to provide a reasonable accommodation, or by demonstrat-
 
 85. See id. at 70–71. 
 86. See Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and 
Consistent Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 606–09 (2000) (concluding that an employee 
may be required to bear certain costs as part of a reasonable accommodation); 
id. at 610–22 (surveying employer burdens that have been found to constitute 
undue hardships). 
 87. See Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 
F.2d 772, 775–76 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
 88. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (set-
ting forth the elements of a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Ti-
tle VII). 
 89. Threat of discharge or discipline is generally sufficient to meet this 
requirement. See EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 n.5 
(9th Cir. 1988); Young v. Sw. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
 90. See, e.g., Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 
1987); Am. Postal Workers Union, 781 F.2d at 775; Turpen v. Mo.–Kan.–Tex. 
R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 
F.2d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 1978). The employee must inform the employer of the 
need for religious accommodation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1) (2000). 
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ing that any reasonable accommodation would result in undue 
hardship.91 Careful application of section 701(j) must distin-
guish between the reasonable accommodation analysis and ex-
amination of undue hardship.92 Part A of this section explores 
possible employer accommodations for pharmacists who refuse 
to dispense certain drugs on religious grounds and discusses 
whether they would be considered reasonable from the em-
ployee’s perspective. Part B examines the accommodations that 
would likely be considered reasonable and determines that they 
would usually impose more than de minimis costs on the em-
ployer. Part C addresses the unresolved question of whether an 
employer must always make a good faith effort to accommodate 
under section 701(j). 
A. POTENTIAL REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS 
Commentators have divided religious accommodation ju-
risprudence into several categories.93 “Work schedule” cases 
comprise by far the largest category.94 Illustrative examples in 
this category include Hardison and Ansonia, where employees 
requested not to work on their Sabbath or on particular holy 
days. A second category relates to the payment of union dues,95 
and a third category addresses rules governing employee ap-
pearance.96 Relatively few employees raise section 701(j) chal-
lenges when they face negative consequences for refusing to 
perform particular job duties on religious grounds.97 Pharma-
 
 91. See, e.g., Am. Postal Workers Union, 781 F.2d at 775–76; Baz v. Wal-
ters, 782 F.2d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 92. See Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“Reasonableness and the avoidance of undue hardship are distinct.”). 
 93. See, e.g., VERN E. HAUCK, ARBITRATING RACE, RELIGION, AND NA-
TIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION GRIEVANCES 119–46 (1997); Douglas Massen-
gill & Donald J. Petersen, Job Requirements and Religious Practices: Conflict 
and Accommodation, 39 LAB. L.J. 402, 407–09 (1988). 
 94. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1) (2000); HAUCK, supra note 93, at 119–28; 
LARSON, supra note 42, § 56.06; Debbie N. Kaminer, When Business and Em-
ployees’ Religion Clash, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 2000, at 1. 
 95. See § 1605.2(d)(2); HAUCK, supra note 93, at 146; LARSON, supra note 
42, § 56.07; KENNETH L. SOVEREIGN, PERSONNEL LAW 75–76 (4th ed. 1999). 
 96. See HAUCK, supra note 93, at 138–40; LARSON, supra note 42, § 56.10. 
 97. See Tramm v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., No. H 87-355, 1989 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16391, at *11 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1989) (mag. j. order) (“Past cases in-
volving religious discrimination in the context of Title VII usually have ad-
dressed the issue of accommodating persons whose religious beliefs prevented 
them from working on their Sabbath or from supporting unions.”); Massengill 
& Petersen, supra note 93, at 408 (stating that work duty conflicts have “sur-
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cists refusing to fill prescriptions on religious grounds fall into 
this last category. Examining accommodations for such em-
ployees, the Fifth Circuit observed that, “[a]ccommodation can 
take place in two fundamental ways: (1) an employee can be ac-
commodated in his or her current position by changing the 
working conditions, or (2) the employer can offer to let the em-
ployee transfer to another reasonably comparable position 
where conflicts are less likely to arise.”98 When an employee re-
fuses to perform a job duty on religious grounds, courts fre-
quently consider the accommodations of transferring either the 
employee or the job duty.99 
Even though section 701(j) does not explicitly say what de-
gree of accommodation is required, the legislative history sug-
gests that Congress did not consider the possibility of employ-
ees refusing categorically to perform certain essential job 
duties.100 Courts typically require accommodations for employ-
ees seeking to observe their Sabbath,101 but similar generosity 
for employees refusing to perform job duties may violate the 
spirit and intent of the statute. 
Regulations for the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
provide a useful analogy102 for determining what constitutes a 
reasonable accommodation when an employee cannot perform 
certain job duties.103 Applying the EEOC regulations related to 
the ADA to the question of whether filling birth control pre-
scriptions is an essential function of a pharmacist requires an-
 
faced on occasion”). 
 98. Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2001); 
see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(iii) (2004) (“When an employee cannot be ac-
commodated either as to his or her entire job or an assignment within the job, 
employers . . . should consider whether or not it is possible to change the job 
assignment or give the employee a lateral transfer.”). 
 99. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (d)(1)(iii). 
 100. See 118 CONG. REC. 705–31 (1972). 
 101. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1470 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
 102. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that dis-
crimination on the basis of religion is “the closest analogy to discrimination on 
the basis of handicap”). 
 103. See Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 
2001) (recognizing that if an employee is unable to perform essential job func-
tions even after reasonable accommodation, the employer has no duty to ac-
commodate); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2004) (requiring modifications that enable 
an employee “to perform the essential functions” of a position). “Essential 
functions” include “the fundamental job duties” of the position and exclude 
those functions which are “marginal.” See § 1630.2(n)(1). 
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swering three questions. First, does the employer actually re-
quire pharmacists to fill birth control prescriptions? Second, 
would removing the function fundamentally alter the position? 
Third, is the position of pharmacist a highly skilled profession 
in which the individual is hired for his expertise or his ability 
to fill birth control prescriptions?104 An employer can readily 
answer the first and third questions in the affirmative. To as-
sist an employer in answering the second question, the EEOC 
suggests two factors that an employer may consider. First, is 
the reason the position exists to perform that function? Second, 
are there few employees available to perform that function?105 
Employers hire pharmacists to fill a variety of prescriptions, 
and they typically expect each pharmacist to be able to fill all 
requested prescriptions.106 Moreover, a pharmacist may only be 
replaced by similarly licensed personnel to perform the job duty 
of dispensing prescriptions.107 Therefore, filling birth control 
prescriptions is an essential function for pharmacists. Thus, 
even under the stricter reasonable accommodations of the ADA, 
an employer would not need to accommodate a pharmacist who 
is unable (or unwilling) to fill birth control prescriptions.108 Be-
cause accommodation of refusing pharmacists would require 
many employers to excuse employees from performing essential 
 
 104. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). 
 105. See id. 
 106. See MICKEY C. SMITH & DAVID A. KNAPP, PHARMACY, DRUGS AND 
MEDICAL CARE 146–47 (5th ed. 1992) (observing that the occupation of phar-
macist is generally not specialized, with limited exceptions not applicable to 
the retail context); see, e.g., Pharmacist.com, Employment Center Job Detail: 
Staff Pharmacist/Graduate Intern http://aphanet.jobcontrolcenter.com/ 
jobdetail.cfm?job=2276467 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) (stating that “major re-
sponsibilities” for Supervalu pharmacists include supervising the dispensing 
of all prescriptions). 
 107. See RICHARD R. ABOOD & DAVID B. BRUSHWOOD, PHARMACY PRACTICE 
AND THE LAW 190 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that federal law prohibits a person 
from dispensing certain drugs if the person is not authorized to do so under 
state law); Harry P. Hagel, Staffing Modifications for Pharmaceutical Care, in 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PHARMACEUTICAL CARE 253, 254–55 (John P. Rovers 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) (noting that pharmacists are exclusively responsible 
for conducting the final check of prescriptions, counseling patients, and con-
ducting a warning assessment); see also Carol Ukens, Medco Faces Federal 
Fraud Charges, DRUG TOPICS, Oct. 20, 2003, at 14 (reporting that a pharmacy 
faced federal fraud charges for using non-pharmacist personnel to dispense 
prescriptions without review by a pharmacist). 
 108. See SOVEREIGN, supra note 95, at 69 (noting that under the ADA, un-
due hardship must be greater than de minimis to excuse an employer from ac-
commodating an employee with a disability). 
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job duties, the EEOC interpretation of the ADA suggests that 
no accommodation may be necessary. 
The facts and circumstances of each particular employment 
relationship guide courts in ascertaining the reasonableness of 
any accommodation.109 An employer might make one of several 
accommodations for objecting pharmacists. 
1. Permit Prescription Transfer to Another Pharmacist 
Employers are likely to accommodate pharmacists by al-
lowing another pharmacist to fill the objectionable prescrip-
tion.110 In American Postal Workers Union, San Francisco Local 
v. Postmaster General,111 the Ninth Circuit considered the obli-
gations of the U.S. Postal Service to accommodate window 
clerks who objected on religious grounds to processing selective 
service registration forms.112 The first accommodation allowed 
employees to refer registrants to other window clerks who were 
willing to process the forms.113 Likewise, an employment policy 
allowing a pharmacist to hand off the objectionable prescription 
to another pharmacist is likely a reasonable accommodation. 
This accommodation may require shift swapping to ensure that 
a second pharmacist is on duty to handle the objectionable pre-
scription.114 Similar accommodations may be implemented by 
creating separate lines for objectionable and nonobjectionable 
prescriptions, or posting hours when objectionable prescriptions 
will not be filled. In the alternative, an objecting pharmacist 
might be required to transfer the prescription to a different 
pharmacy.115 
 
 
 
 109. See Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 902–03 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 110. See Teliska, supra note 1, at 239–40 (surveying the refusal policies of 
major pharmacy chains and noting that both Walgreens and CVS have policies 
requiring pharmacists to refer prescriptions to another pharmacist on duty or 
to another pharmacy). 
 111. 781 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. The U.S. Postal Service later revised its accommodation policy 
and withdrew this accommodation. See id. 
 114. Cf. Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(considering a similar accommodation within a team of three employment 
counselors). 
 115. See Teliska, supra note 1, at 239–40 (noting that Walgreens and CVS 
pharmacies allow the refusing pharmacist to refer the prescription to another 
pharmacy). 
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Employees are required to cooperate and to be flexible in 
achieving their requested accommodation,116 but sometimes an 
employee refuses on religious grounds to participate in a pro-
posed accommodation. For example, in EEOC v. J.P. Stevens & 
Co.,117 employees argued that the employer’s accommodation 
requiring them to recruit coworkers to swap Sabbath shifts it-
self violated their religious beliefs.118 The court determined that 
the accommodation was unreasonable, particularly because the 
employer could have easily taken measures to recruit 
coworkers to swap shifts.119 As Neil Noesen’s manager learned 
on July 6, 2002, some pharmacists object on religious grounds 
to playing any role in the transfer of an objectionable prescrip-
tion.120 For such individuals, courts may find that only em-
ployer-initiated accommodations creating separate lines or 
posting schedules are reasonable, and that requiring a pharma-
cist to transfer an objectionable prescription to another phar-
macist, whether at the same work site or at another pharmacy, 
is an unreasonable accommodation, and therefore is not re-
quired under Title VII.121 
2. Facilitate Transfer to a Different Position at the Same 
Work Location 
American Postal Workers Union evaluated a second ac-
commodation offered by the Postal Service. The Postal Service 
revised its regulations to require all window clerks to process 
selective service registration forms; the regulations directed 
those clerks with religious objections to transfer to other posi-
tions.122 The Ninth Circuit determined that the Postal Service’s 
 
 116. See Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 503 (5th Cir. 
2001) (“An employee has a duty to cooperate in achieving accommodation of 
his or her religious beliefs, and must be flexible in achieving that end.”). 
 117. 740 F. Supp. 1135 (M.D.N.C. 1990) (mem.). 
 118. See id. at 1136. 
 119. Id. at 1139; accord Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1088 (6th 
Cir. 1987). 
 120. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Noesen, No. 01 PHM 080, 
paras. 26, 34 (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr. 13, 2005), https://drl.wi 
.gov/dept/decisions/docs/0405070.htm; Herbe, supra note 14, at 89 (“For many 
pharmacists, a referral would be no more than passive participation in the ac-
tivity they initially refused to actively assist.”). 
 121. Cf. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d at 1088–89 (concluding that requiring 
an employee to violate his religious beliefs by recruiting his own Sabbath re-
placements was not a reasonable accommodation, and that requiring the em-
ployer to recruit replacements did not constitute an undue hardship). 
 122. See Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 
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proposed accommodation of allowing job transfer was poten-
tially reasonable.123 The court noted that the workers’ objec-
tions to the accommodation were grounded in the belief that 
“the accommodation would place them in a less attractive em-
ployment status.”124 Acknowledging this objection, the court 
held that “[w]here an employer proposes an accommodation 
which effectively eliminates the religious conflict faced by a 
particular employee . . . the inquiry under Title VII reduces to 
whether the accommodation reasonably preserves the affected 
employee’s employment status.”125 Therefore, courts are to de-
termine whether transfer to a less attractive position is reason-
able under the circumstances.126 
At least one other court has explored the reasonableness of 
job transfer as an accommodation. In Bruff v. North Mississippi 
Health Services, Inc.,127 the Fifth Circuit entertained a Title VII 
claim brought by a counselor who refused on religious grounds 
to provide certain counseling assistance.128 Sandra Bruff 
worked for a medical center as one of three employee assistance 
counselors providing counseling to employees of several re-
gional businesses.129 Typically, only one counselor would travel 
to a work site to conduct sessions.130 Bruff ’ s employer sug-
gested that she request a transfer to another position or de-
partment in which such conflicts would be minimized.131 Bruff 
chose not to apply for another available counselor position and 
was eventually terminated.132 The court held that the em-
ployer’s offer of employment counseling to identify another po-
sition at the center and the thirty-day extension to find another 
position constituted a reasonable accommodation.133 The court 
 
F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
 123. See id. at 776–77. 
 124. Id. at 776. 
 125. Id. at 776–77. 
 126. See id. 
 127. 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 128. See id. at 497. Bruff specifically requested to “be excused from . . . ac-
tively helping people involved in the homosexual lifestyle to have a better rela-
tionship with their homosexual partners. This would also include helping per-
sons who have a sexual relationship outside of marriage have a better sexual 
relationship.” Id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. at 498. 
 132. See id. at 498–99. 
 133. See id. at 501. 
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found that a transfer to a noncounseling position resulting in 
more than a fifty-percent reduction in pay would not necessar-
ily constitute an unreasonable accommodation.134 
Based on these cases, courts may find that requiring a 
pharmacist to transfer to another position that would not re-
quire the pharmacist to dispense objectionable medications is a 
reasonable accommodation. However, a retail establishment 
with a pharmacy is unlikely to have comparable positions for 
which a pharmacist is qualified.135 According to one report, 
“[p]harmacists are among the most highly compensated em-
ployees in a retail environment,”136 and the average annual 
pharmacist salary in a chain drugstore is over $92,000.137 In 
light of Bruff, an employer might encourage an objecting phar-
macist to apply for available managerial positions, even if the 
pharmacist would face a substantial pay cut.138 All positions 
the employer encouraged Bruff to pursue made use of her coun-
seling and social work background.139 A similar job transfer ac-
commodation for pharmacists would probably not make use of 
the employee’s technical training, and therefore might not “rea-
sonably preserve[] the affected employee’s employment status,” 
as required by American Postal Workers Union.140 
3. Facilitate Transfer to a Different Work Location 
Transfer to a similar job assignment at a different work 
site may also be a reasonable accommodation.141 The Seventh 
 
 134. See id. at 498 n.5 (noting that the available noncounseling positions 
paid between $7 and $8 per hour, while Bruff was earning over $16 per hour 
in her counseling position); id. at 502 n.23 (“As previously noted, these non-
counselor positions would have required Bruff to take a significant reduction 
in salary. This alone, however, does not make the accommodation unreason-
able.”). 
 135. See SMITH & KNAPP, supra note 106, at 138 (noting that there are lim-
ited opportunities for nonadministrative professional advancement in chain 
pharmacies). 
 136. Mike Troy, Wal-Mart Rewrites Prescription for Competition, DSN RE-
TAILING TODAY, Aug. 16, 2004, at 4, 42. 
 137. See Julie Schmit, Help Wanted at Your Drugstore: Pharmacist Short-
age Makes Grads Highly Sought After, USA TODAY, Aug. 17, 2005, at 3B. 
 138. Cf. Bruff, 244 F.3d at 502 n.23. 
 139. See id at 502–03. 
 140. Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 
772, 776–77 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
 141. Cf. 4 Pharmacists Sue over Contraceptive Dispute, WASH. POST, Jan. 
29, 2006, at A15 (quoting a Walgreens spokesperson who confirmed that sev-
eral refusing pharmacists in Illinois were offered the opportunity to transfer to 
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Circuit in Rodriguez v. City of Chicago142 examined a police of-
ficer’s religious objection to protecting abortion clinics.143 The 
court determined that the police department’s offer to transfer 
the officer to a district with no abortion clinic constituted a rea-
sonable accommodation.144 
Drawing on Rodriguez, an employer might offer an object-
ing pharmacist the opportunity to transfer to another facility 
that does not dispense objectionable medications.145 Some em-
ployers may provide pharmacy services at nursing homes or 
other extended-care facilities where objectionable medications 
are not dispensed; in those situations, a transfer may be a rea-
sonable accommodation. However, independent and chain 
pharmacies are unlikely to have such facilities. In other situa-
tions, a national chain could assist an objecting pharmacist in a 
rural pharmacy with few shift options to transfer to a different 
site with more pharmacists on staff. In these cases, however, a 
lengthy commute or employee relocation may be unreason-
able,146 and an employer does not need to give preference to ob-
jecting pharmacists when hiring for what might be more desir-
able positions in more populated areas.147 
 
jobs in states with less stringent pharmacy regulations). 
 142. 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 143. Id. at 773–74. 
 144. Id. at 775. Chief Judge Richard A. Posner, concurring with the judg-
ment of the court, advocated a broader ruling that persons employed in gov-
ernmental protective services “have no right under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 to recuse themselves from having to protect persons of whose ac-
tivities they disapprove for religious (or any other) reasons.” Id. at 779 (Pos-
ner, C.J., concurring). Posner’s views were later incorporated into the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion in Endres v. Indiana State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 926–27 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
 145. See Marilyn Gardner, Pharmacists’ Moral Beliefs vs. Women’s Legal 
Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 26, 2004, at 11 (noting that some 
pharmacists objecting to contraceptives have found jobs in nursing homes); 
Shortage of Pharmacists, supra note 15, at 246 (reporting “the growing role of 
pharmacists in medication therapy management, immunizations and other 
patient care services”). 
 146. See Ukens, supra note 30, at 40 (“Be ready to move all over the coun-
try to find a job . . . .” (quoting a pharmacist who was terminated for refusing 
to dispense birth control)). 
 147. Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977) 
(holding that Title VII does not require employers to deny the job and shift 
preferences of some employees in order to accommodate the religious needs of 
others); Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 502 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that Title VII does not obligate employers to give an employee seek-
ing religious accommodation preference over other employees applying for the 
same transfer position). 
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In summary, employers have three primary means to ac-
commodate objecting pharmacists: facilitate the transfer of the 
prescription, facilitate the transfer of the pharmacist to differ-
ent job duties, or facilitate the transfer of the pharmacist to a 
different site that will not require the pharmacist to engage in 
objectionable activities. Ansonia requires the pharmacy either 
to offer at least one of these reasonable accommodations or to 
demonstrate that every reasonable accommodation imposes an 
undue hardship.148 
B. THE DE MINIMIS COST RESTRICTION 
An employer may object to any of the three reasonable ac-
commodations examined above by arguing that the accommo-
dation constitutes an undue hardship, imposing more than a de 
minimis cost on its business.149 The following sections consider 
each accommodation under Hardison’s de minimis cost stan-
dard. 
1. Permit Prescription Transfer to Another Pharmacist 
Permitting the pharmacist to transfer the prescription to 
another pharmacist may impose significant costs on a phar-
macy. For some employers, another pharmacist might normally 
always be on duty, and the accommodation could be fairly 
smooth.150 Yet even under these seemingly ideal conditions, a 
court may find an undue hardship. An arbitrator considered 
the complaint of a grocery store cashier who refused to sell lot-
tery tickets on religious grounds in the case of In re Lucky 
Stores, Inc.151 The arbitrator determined that the sale of lottery 
tickets was “a reasonable and appropriate task” for the position 
of cashier, and found that “it was not operationally feasible” for 
the store to establish one check-out register as a “no lottery 
 
 148. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986). 
 149. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977). 
 150. See Gardner, supra note 145 (“‘In the great majority of cases, the 
pharmacist’s right to conscience is exercised appropriately and seamlessly . . .’ 
[American Pharmacists Association spokesperson Michael] Stewart says. ‘A 
pharmacist can say, “Let me get Bob for you, ma’am,” and that’s the end of 
that.’”). 
 151. 88 L.A. 841, 841–42 (1987). Courts “may properly afford . . . great 
weight” to an arbitral decision that thoroughly considers the factual issues 
surrounding an employee’s Title VII rights. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 
415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974). 
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ticket stand.”152 The arbitrator noted that this accommodation 
“would cause scheduling problems as well as the operational, 
customer flow problems” and concluded that these challenges 
imposed a “more than de minimis” burden on the employer.153 
Because pharmacists working on the same shift typically 
work in the same area and serve the same queue of customers, 
accommodation involving handing a prescription over to an-
other on-duty pharmacist is likely to impose only a de minimis 
cost on an employer.154 When a pharmacist objects to transfer-
ring a prescription to another pharmacist on duty, however, 
Lucky Stores suggests that section 701(j) does not require a 
pharmacy either to implement a separate queuing system for 
nonobjectionable prescriptions or to require customers to seek 
out the nonobjecting pharmacist.155 
These same-pharmacy transfer accommodations may be 
impractical for pharmacies that do not always have two phar-
macists on duty.156 Many chain drug stores now offer twenty-
four-hour pharmacy services, and only one pharmacist may be 
on duty during evening and late-night hours and on the week-
ends (as was the case at the K-Mart where Neil Noesen 
worked).157 Under those circumstances, an employer could im-
plement four different accommodations. First, an employer 
could ensure that an objecting pharmacist never works a solo 
shift, so that a nonobjecting pharmacist would always be avail-
able to fill an objectionable prescription.158 Second, an employer 
 
 152. Lucky Stores, 88 L.A. at 844, 846. 
 153. Id. at 846. 
 154. Cf. Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 
F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (noting a similar accommodation 
allowing objecting postal clerks to refer selective service registrants to other 
window clerks). 
 155. See Lucky Stores, 88 L.A. at 846. 
 156. See Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(describing an employer’s shift system with a solo pharmacist on duty for 56 of 
the 101 hours of every week that the pharmacy was open). 
 157. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Noesen, No. 01 PHM 080, 
para. 21 (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr. 13, 2005), https://drl.wi.gov/ 
dept/decisions/docs/0405070.htm; cf. Brener, 671 F.2d at 143 (observing that 
the hospital pharmacy was staffed by a solo pharmacist on weekends). 
 158. Cf. Press Release, Am. Life League, Canada Safeway—Preparing to 
Sell Euthanasia Drugs? (Apr. 4, 2000) 2006 LEXIS iINTERNATIONAL NEWS 
(noting that the policy of Canada Safeway is that if an objecting pharmacist 
cannot comply with the duty to fill all prescriptions, “the pharmacist will not 
be scheduled to work in any store during any period of time when he or she 
would be the sole pharmacist on duty”). 
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could ensure that another pharmacist is always on call to fill an 
objectionable prescription. Third, an employer could require an 
objecting pharmacist to transfer the prescription to a different 
pharmacy. Fourth, an employer could post a sign listing the 
days and hours when objectionable prescriptions will not be 
filled. As demonstrated below, each of these accommodations 
imposes a more than de minimis cost on the employer, and 
therefore is not required under section 701(j). 
An employer may attempt to accommodate the objecting 
pharmacist by structuring shift assignments so that an object-
ing pharmacist will never be the only pharmacist on duty. 
Many pharmacies, however, may not be able to provide this ac-
commodation because they never have more than one pharma-
cist on duty.159 In larger pharmacies with some solo shifts and 
some shifts staffed by more than one pharmacist, the solo shifts 
are more likely to involve undesirable hours, such as evenings 
and weekends.160 Other pharmacists might volunteer for these 
solo shifts, but Hardison expressly held that an employer is not 
required to force other employees to take undesirable shifts in 
order to accommodate a religious objector.161 
This accommodation is similar to voluntary shift swapping 
that some employers have used to accommodate Saturday Sab-
bath observers.162 An employer may be required to attempt 
such voluntary shift swapping,163 but courts sometimes reject 
these accommodations for imposing an undue hardship on em-
ployers.164 Moreover, one circuit determined that an employer’s 
obligation to facilitate shift swapping would constitute an un-
due hardship if it involved more than ninety minutes of ef-
fort.165 
 
 159. See, e.g., Katie Fairbank, Waging a Moral Battle from Behind the 
Counter: Pharmacists’ Refusal to Fill Contraception Prescriptions Prompts the 
Question: Whose Choice Is It to Make?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 24, 2005, 
at 1A (reporting that many Texas pharmacies have only one pharmacist). 
 160. See, e.g., Brener, 671 F.2d at 143. Under the work schedule described 
in Brener, an objecting pharmacist would have to work either the 8 a.m. to 4 
p.m. or the 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. weekday shift in order to avoid working any solo 
hours. See id. The pharmacist would not be able to work the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. or 
the 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. weekday shifts, or either of the weekend shifts. See id. 
 161. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977). 
 162. See, e.g., id. 
 163. See EEOC v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 740 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (M.D.N.C. 
1990) (mem.). 
 164. See, e.g., Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81. 
 165. See Turpen v. Mo.–Kan.–Tex. R.R., 736 F.2d 1022, 1025, 1028 (5th 
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Pharmacists seeking shift swaps impose an even greater 
hardship on employers than Saturday Sabbatarians seeking 
shift swaps; the former are likely never to be able to work an 
undesirable shift, while the latter are willing to work all but 
one or two undesirable shifts. Therefore, a Saturday Sabbath 
observer is able to swap shifts with someone working late 
nights or Sundays, and such swaps may be easily facilitated.166 
An objecting pharmacist, on the other hand, would be asking 
coworkers to take evening, late night, and weekend shifts and 
give up regular weekday shifts. Coworker complaints about 
shift changes or the absence of volunteers could constitute evi-
dence that this accommodation imposes a more than de mini-
mis cost on the business by creating work schedules that are 
impossible to fill without hiring additional pharmacists or un-
dermining employee morale.167 
The second option is to ensure that another pharmacist is 
always on call. K-Mart attempted to provide this accommoda-
tion for Neil Noesen.168 When Amanda Renz contacted the store 
manager, the manager called Noesen’s supervisor, who was the 
head pharmacist.169 Even if a supervisor is available, or an-
other pharmacist is on call, this accommodation could consti-
tute an undue hardship on an employer under the terms of 
Hardison because it might require an employer to pay premium 
wages to the fill-in pharmacist, or it could detract from a su-
pervisor’s other work duties.170 Furthermore, in light of the 
critical shortage of pharmacists,171 many employers may be un-
able to ensure that a back-up pharmacist is on call.172 
 
Cir. 1984). 
 166. See Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1470 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that as long as the Saturday Sabbatarian worked an “equal number 
of undesirable shifts,” there would be no undue hardship on other employees). 
 167. See Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146–47 (5th Cir. 
1982) (concluding that complaints of coworkers and disrupted work routines 
resulting from shift swapping could constitute an undue hardship); cf. Hardi-
son, 432 U.S. at 81 (concluding that the employer did not need to compel other 
employees to work Hardison’s shifts after no coworkers volunteered to swap). 
 168. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Noesen, No. 01 PHM 080, 
para. 16 (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr. 13, 2005), https://drl.wi.gov/dept/ 
decisions/docs/0405070.htm. 
 169. See id. para. 36. 
 170. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 68–69. 
 171. See Shortage of Pharmacists, supra note 15, at 246. As argued below, 
this shortage may also encourage employers to accommodate objecting phar-
macists beyond the requirements of Title VII. 
 172. See Schmit, supra note 137 (noting that in rural areas it may take two 
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The third option is to require an objecting pharmacist to 
transfer the prescription to a different pharmacy. As noted 
above, some pharmacists will object on religious grounds to 
their own participation in this accommodation, and therefore 
the accommodation is unreasonable for them.173 For pharma-
cists who do not object to transferring a prescription, this ac-
commodation imposes greater than de minimis costs by sacrific-
ing customer business.174 If the objectionable prescription is for 
oral contraceptives, the pharmacy is likely to lose the profits 
from an entire year of dispensing that medication to the cus-
tomer.175 Moreover, because most consumers prefer to fill all of 
their regular prescriptions in the same pharmacy, the employer 
will likely forego all of that customer’s business.176 Addition-
ally, transfers may alienate customers who find the process 
humiliating and discriminatory.177 In some cases, store policies 
allowing pharmacists to transfer prescriptions to other phar-
macies have generated negative publicity and even protests,178 
and in some jurisdictions pharmacies can be sanctioned for fail-
ing to fill customer prescriptions.179 All of these business costs 
 
to three hours to fill an emergency vacancy). 
 173. See EEOC v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 740 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (M.D.N.C. 
1990) (mem.). 
 174. Cf., e.g., Fairbank, supra note 159 (reporting that a pharmacy in a 
Texas small town “had been filling about five or six prescriptions [for oral con-
traceptives] a day” and that ceasing to fill those prescriptions “had a financial 
consequence”). 
 175. See Kara Platoni, Free the Pill!, E. BAY EXPRESS (, June 22, 2005, at 
14, 14, available at http://www.eastbayexpress.com/issues/2005-06-22/news/ 
feature.html (observing that prescriptions for oral contraception typically pro-
vide a one-year supply). 
 176. Cf., e.g., Fairbank, supra note 159 (“It made a huge difference because 
they would get their other prescriptions somewhere else too. I assumed that 
would happen, and it did.” (quoting a pharmacy owner who decided to stop 
carrying oral contraceptives)). 
 177. See Freedom of Conscience for Small Pharmacies: Hearing Before the 
H. Small Bus. Comm., 109th Cong. 13–14 (2005) (statement of oral contracep-
tion consumer Megan Kelly). These customer concerns are equally relevant for 
the separate-queue accommodation. 
 178. See Josephine Marcotty, Birth-Control Battle at Target, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Nov. 11, 2005, at D1 (describing Planned Parenthood protests 
at Target headquarters to draw attention to the retailer’s policy of allowing 
pharmacists to turn away customers requesting emergency contraceptives). 
 179. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 733, 4314–15 (West 2005); see 
also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief paras. 28–30, Menges v. 
Blagojevich, No. 3:05-cv-03307 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2005) (stating that after Illi-
nois initiated disciplinary actions against several Walgreens stores for failure 
to comply with the state law, the chain established a new employment policy 
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constitute an undue hardship on an employer,180 and therefore 
this accommodation is not required under Title VII. 
A final option is to post a sign listing the days and hours 
when objectionable prescriptions will not be filled. A pharma-
cist who objects to participating in the transfer of a prescription 
may consider this accommodation reasonable,181 but the phar-
macy still incurs most of the business costs involved with the 
previous accommodation. Customers who approach the phar-
macy with an objectionable prescription at a time when the ob-
jecting pharmacist is on duty will have an incentive to turn to a 
competitor, if one is available.182 This accommodation provides 
customers with additional information and options, and there-
fore it may not drive away as much business as a policy of out-
right transfer to other pharmacies. Some consumers, however, 
will need or want their prescriptions filled before a 
nonobjecting pharmacist is available. Moreover, this accommo-
dation encumbers customers such as Amanda Renz, who al-
ready have their yearly prescriptions on file and would depend 
on the pharmacist to participate in the transfer of the refill.183 
 
requiring all pharmacists to dispense emergency contraception and subse-
quently suspended several pharmacists who refused to comply with the pol-
icy). For discussion of the Illinois rule, see Sarah Vokes, Note, “Just Fill the 
Prescription”: Why Illinois’ Emergency Rule Appropriately Resolves the Tension 
Between Religion and Contraception in the Pharmacy Context, 24 LAW & INEQ. 
(forthcoming 2006). Other states have enacted legislation protecting pharma-
cists who refuse to dispense certain medications on religious grounds. See, e.g., 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4) (2000); see also Rob Stein, Health Workers’ 
Choice Debated: Proposals Back Right Not to Treat, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 
2006, at A1 (reporting that several state legislatures are considering similar 
legislation). Because Hardison’s de minimis standard for undue hardship ar-
guably draws the boundary between constitutional government protections 
against religion-based discrimination and unconstitutional government estab-
lishment of religion, see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 
89 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting), these state laws may be unconstitutional 
if they are found to impose a greater than de minimis burden on employers. 
 180. Cf. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84–85 (1977) (noting that accommodations 
imposing financial costs on the employer in the form of reduced efficiency or 
payment of higher wages for replacement workers constituted an undue hard-
ship); Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, 
C.J., concurring) (“It is undue hardship in spades when the necessary accom-
modation would strike a body blow to the employer’s business.”). 
 181. See Herbe, supra note 14, at 101. 
 182. But see Teliska, supra note 1, at 244 (arguing that pharmacist refusals 
impose a heavy burden on rural and low-income women, who may lack conven-
ient access to back-up pharmacies). 
 183. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Noesen, No. 01 PHM 080, 
paras. 21–22 (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. Apr. 13, 2005), https://drl.wi.gov/ 
dept/decisions/docs/0405070.htm. 
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The D.C. District Court examined a similar accommodation 
in which objectionable work duties were set aside until other 
employees were available. In Haring v. Blumenthal,184 Paul 
Haring alleged that the IRS discriminated against him with re-
spect to promotions because he objected on religious grounds to 
processing certain tax-exemption applications.185 The IRS ac-
commodated Haring by not assigning him to process such ap-
plications,186 but determined that promoting Haring to a re-
viewer position would create operational difficulties.187 The 
court found that the IRS had failed to demonstrate an undue 
hardship, noting that Haring objected to a very small percent-
age of applications that the division processed, and observing 
that delays incurred as a result of the accommodation would be 
inconsequential because processing delays were normal within 
the division.188 
Pharmacist refusals differ from Harding’s refusal to proc-
ess IRS forms in several ways. First, objectionable prescriptions 
may not be a very small percentage of the prescriptions proc-
essed by a pharmacy,189 and therefore asking customers to re-
turn when another pharmacist is available may disrupt work 
flow. Second, while delays in processing IRS forms may be typi-
cal and inconsequential, pharmacy customers generally expect 
their prescriptions to be filled quickly.190 Third, the IRS does 
not need to compete with other service providers in processing 
tax-exempt applications; pharmacies are participants in a com-
petitive marketplace which places a premium on efficiency and 
customer service.191 Fourth, the financial success of the IRS is 
 
 184. 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 1979). 
 185. He objected to tax exemptions for organizations involved with or pro-
moting a variety of activities which he determined violated “God’s Natural 
Law,” including abortions, homosexuality, euthanasia, atheism, legalization of 
marijuana, and artificial contraception. See id. at 1175 n.4, 1176. 
 186. Id. at 1180 n.21. 
 187. See id. at 1180. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See Terri Madden et al., 2000 in Review: Growth Slows, but Goes On, 
MED. MKTG. & MEDIA, May 2001, at 74, 78 (reporting that oral contraceptives 
constituted the seventh-largest class of therapeutic prescription drugs dis-
pensed in 2000, accounting for over 79 million prescriptions nationwide). 
 190. See Assessing HIPAA: How Federal Medicaid Record Privacy Regula-
tions Can Be Improved: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. En-
ergy & Commerce Comm., 107th Cong. 53 (2001) (statement of CVS director of 
government relations Carlos R. Ortiz). 
 191. See Ritzman Counts on Service for Competitive Edge, CHAIN DRUG 
REV. (N.Y.), Apr. 26, 2004, at 200. 
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not contingent on processing tax-exempt status applications. A 
pharmacy, on the other hand, may lose profits when an accom-
modation pushes customers to seek the services of a competi-
tor.192 
Courts have yet to resolve the question of whether the 
scope of an employer’s obligation to accommodate under Title 
VII may ever be limited by an employer’s extrapolation that ac-
commodating one employee would potentially result in an un-
due hardship if other employees were to assert similar 
rights.193 Some of the above accommodations might not pose an 
undue hardship if only one pharmacist requested accommoda-
tion. In the case of shift swapping or schedule posting, accom-
modating a second or third pharmacist could constitute an un-
due hardship, where the first accommodation may not.194 If 
only one employee requests accommodation, courts may look 
unfavorably on an extrapolation argument; an employer will 
have stronger grounds for termination if it can demonstrate 
that accommodating even the first pharmacist would result in 
more than de minimis costs.195 
 
 192. See, e.g., Ruderman, supra note 17 (recalling that when a neighbor-
hood pharmacy refused to fill her father’s morphine prescription, she sought 
out a larger competitor and “for years afterward” returned there “to buy items 
[she] could have bought more conveniently elsewhere”); Sanchez, supra note 
11 (reporting that after a pharmacist told Adriane Gilbert on the telephone 
that he could not help her because he opposed birth control, she “decided to 
find another drugstore” even though the pharmacy called back minutes later 
to apologize). 
 193. See Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1181 (D.D.C. 1979). 
Compare Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1979) (argu-
ing that “undue hardship” excludes the employer’s speculations regarding the 
future behavior of the employee’s coworkers) and Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 
589 F.2d 403, 406–07 (9th Cir. 1978) (same) with Endres v. Ind. State Police, 
349 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir. 2003) (arguing that allowing a police officer to re-
fuse a work assignment would undermine discipline and prompt other public 
service officers to refuse assignments on religious grounds). EEOC regulations 
state: “A mere assumption that many more people . . . may also need accom-
modation is not evidence of undue hardship.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1) 
(2004). 
 194. For example, an employer using the shift schedule used in Brener 
could not accommodate more than one pharmacist out of five and still ensure 
that all prescriptions would be filled. See Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 
F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 195. See Brown , 601 F.2d at 961 (holding that undue hardship is limited to 
the hardship imposed by the specific accommodation at issue and may not in-
clude consideration of “anticipated or multiplied hardship” that may result if 
other employees make similar requests for accommodation). 
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2. Facilitate Transfer to a Different Position at the Same 
Work Location 
If an employer has a suitable open position, this accommo-
dation is likely to create no more than de minimis costs for the 
employer. Even in Bruff v. North Mississippi Health Services, 
Inc., the court did not require the employer to create a new po-
sition for the objecting employee.196 Instead, the employer made 
a reasonable accommodation by providing job counseling to as-
sist the employee in applying for positions as they became 
available within the company.197 As the Supreme Court held in 
Hardison, an employee is not entitled to any preferential status 
when the company considers applications for vacancies; inter-
fering with standard hiring decisions would constitute an un-
due hardship.198 Therefore, if an objecting pharmacist would 
find employment in a different position at the same location 
reasonable, then the employer must assist the pharmacist in 
applying for such a position when it becomes available. 
3. Facilitate Transfer to a Different Work Location 
This accommodation is probably not available to many re-
tail pharmacies. Most pharmacy chains have unfilled pharma-
cist positions in many locations,199 but each pharmacist pre-
sumably is responsible for filling objectionable prescriptions. In 
the rare instance when an employer has certain work sites 
where a pharmacist would not need to process objectionable 
prescriptions, the employer would need to provide some assis-
tance to the employee to apply for vacancies in those loca-
tions.200 As with the previous accommodation, the employer 
would not be obligated to hire the employee for the position, be-
cause any interference with standard hiring practices would 
impose more than de minimis costs.201 
C. DOES SECTION 701(J) REQUIRE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO 
ACCOMMODATE? 
There may be many pharmacies that are unable to make 
any reasonable accommodation without undue hardship. For 
 
 196. See 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 197. See id. 
 198. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977). 
 199. See Schmit, supra note 137. 
 200. Cf. Bruff , 244 F.3d at 501. 
 201. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81. 
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example, a pharmacy may have only one pharmacist on duty 
most or all of the time,202 and may have no other positions to 
which a pharmacist could attempt to transfer. Under those cir-
cumstances, does the pharmacy need to make a good faith ef-
fort to accommodate the pharmacist, or may the employer ter-
minate the pharmacist immediately? While some observers 
contend that an employer must consider some accommoda-
tions,203 the case law is unsettled on this point. 
In Tramm v. Porter Memorial Hospital,204 a court consid-
ered whether a hospital was required to accommodate a work-
room instrument aide who objected on religious grounds to 
cleaning and preparing instruments used in performing abor-
tions.205 The court found that the hospital violated section 
701(j) of Title VII because it “made no effort whatsoever to ac-
commodate [the employee]’s religious beliefs.”206 The court ob-
served that the hospital failed to “show that an accommodation 
. . . would cause significant difficulties or costs.”207 Although 
the court appeared to articulate a more rigorous standard than 
the de minimis burden established under Hardison,208 the hos-
pital’s failure to make a good faith effort to accommodate was 
dispositive.209 
The Seventh Circuit addressed an employer’s obligation to 
make a good faith effort to accommodate in Ryan v. United 
States Department of Justice.210 John Ryan, an FBI agent, re-
fused on religious grounds to be involved with investigation of 
vandalism at military recruiting facilities.211 Ryan was termi-
 
 202. See Fairbank, supra note 159 (noting that many Texas pharmacies 
have only one pharmacist). 
 203. See Massengill & Petersen, supra note 93, at 403 (“An employer’s con-
sideration of some type of accommodation is the minimum legal requirement”). 
 204. No. H 87-355, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1989) 
(mag. j. order). 
 205. See id. at *1–2. 
 206. Id. at *12. 
 207. Id. at *13. 
 208. Black’s Law Dictionary defines de minimis as “[t]rifling; minimal” or 
“so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004). The magistrate judge’s reference 
to “significant difficulties or costs,” Tramm, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at 
*13 (emphasis added), reflects a higher than de minimis standard. If the hos-
pital had made a good faith effort, the court would have had to apply the 
Hardison standard more carefully. 
 209. See Tramm, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at *12. 
 210. 950 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 211. Id. at 459. According to Ryan, the Roman Catholic Church required all 
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nated for refusing to carry out a lawful direct order.212 The 
court held that Title VII did not compel the FBI to attempt to 
reassign cases, and therefore termination was appropriate: 
It is difficult for any organization to accommodate employees who are 
choosy about assignments; for a paramilitary organization the tension 
is even greater . . . . Compelled, as it is by Title VII, to have one rule 
for all of the diverse religious beliefs and practices in the United 
States, the FBI may choose to be stingy with exceptions lest the de-
mand for them overwhelm it.213 
In Ryan, the court did not require the employer to make a 
good faith effort to accommodate the employee’s religious be-
liefs.214 The employee’s refusal to accept a swap of assignments 
initiated by a coworker and his failure to propose any means of 
accommodation throughout the disciplinary process may have 
spurred the court’s reluctance to impose an affirmative burden 
on the employer to propose accommodations.215 
Endres v. Indiana State Police216 presented the Seventh 
Circuit with a narrower set of facts than Ryan. Benjamin En-
dres refused on religious grounds a work assignment to serve 
as a Gaming Commission Agent at a casino and was subse-
quently terminated.217 Importantly, the police force offered En-
dres no accommodation, and the Seventh Circuit held that no 
such offer was required under Title VII.218 The court noted the 
unique role of public safety officers in upholding all laws and 
protecting all persons from harm.219 
Based on these precedents, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether a pharmacy must make a good faith effort to accom-
modate when it has every reason to believe that each possible 
accommodation either will be unreasonable, and therefore will 
be rejected by the employee, or will incur more than de minimis 
 
members to be peacemakers, thereby making it improper for him to investi-
gate “groups that destroy governmental property to express their opposition to 
violence.” Id. at 460. 
 212. See id. at 459–60. 
 213. Id. at 462. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. at 461 (describing employer acceptance of Ryan’s rigid position 
as “capitulation rather than accommodation”). 
 216. 349 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 217. See id. at 923. 
 218. See id. at 926–27 (“Certainly nothing in Ryan or Rodriguez implies 
that there must be such an offer . . . . [W]e hold that [section 701(j)] does not 
[require an offer of accommodation]. Endres has made a demand that it would 
be unreasonable to require any police or fire department to tolerate.”). 
 219. See id. at 927. 
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costs. If a pharmacist requests certain accommodations, as in 
Tramm, courts may expect a good faith effort to explore those 
possibilities.220 If a pharmacist refuses initial efforts to accom-
modate, as in Ryan, courts might not impose any further bur-
den on the employer.221 While pharmacists do not play the 
unique societal role of public safety officers, they do provide an 
important public service in providing access to health care,222 
and as a profession they enjoy a monopoly on the right to pro-
vide the public with access to certain drugs.223 Nonetheless, ab-
sence of a public safety imperative suggests that an employer 
terminating a pharmacist without first making a good faith ef-
fort to accommodate will not receive the favored treatment af-
forded to government employers in Endres and Ryan.224 If an 
employee dismisses the proposed accommodations as unrea-
sonable, then the employer should be prepared to demonstrate 
that any other accommodations will impose greater than de 
minimis costs. In such cases, the employer will not violate Title 
VII by terminating the refusing pharmacist. 
CONCLUSION 
Many pharmacies currently go beyond the legal require-
ments of Title VII to accommodate pharmacists who refuse to 
dispense certain medications on religious grounds, and some 
employers mistakenly assert that these accommodations are 
required under Title VII.225 This Note demonstrates that nearly 
every available reasonable accommodation imposes more than 
de minimis costs on a pharmacy’s business. An employer con-
fronted with a pharmacist, such as Neil Noesen, who refuses to 
 
 220. See Tramm v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., No. H 87-355, 1989 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16391, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 1989) (mag. j. order); SOVEREIGN, su-
pra note 95, at 75. 
 221. Cf. Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 459–60 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 222. See Teliska, supra note 1, at 233. 
 223. See Frank M. Archer, Emergency Contraceptives and Professional Eth-
ics: A Critical Review, CAN. PHARM. J., May 2000, at 22, 23. 
 224. See Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he 
employer must establish that it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate the 
employee’s religious practices.”). 
 225. See, e.g., Barbara Polichetti, Pharmacist Refuses to Fill Contraceptive 
Prescription, PROVIDENCE J. (R.I.), Aug. 11, 2005, at A1 (“As an employer . . . 
we must accommodate a sincerely held religious conviction that may prevent a 
pharmacist from dispensing a certain prescription.” (quoting Eileen Howard 
Dunn, vice president of corporate communications and community relations 
for CVS)). 
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dispense drugs on religious grounds should make a good faith 
effort to accommodate the pharmacist’s objections. Such efforts 
may include offering career counseling to assist the pharmacist 
in applying for other positions, or initiating a voluntary shift-
swapping program. A pharmacy need not allow pharmacists to 
transfer prescriptions to other businesses and has no obligation 
to have another pharmacist on call to take over the objecting 
pharmacist’s job duties. Such accommodations would alienate 
customers such as Amanda Renz and impose greater than de 
minimis costs on the business. 
The pharmaceutical industry will continue to create drugs 
to which some pharmacists object on religious grounds. Em-
ployers must anticipate that some pharmacists will object not 
only to birth control, but also to Ritalin,226 Viagra for unmar-
ried men,227 or drugs to treat AIDS;228 some pharmacists may 
even object on religious grounds to serving particular custom-
ers.229 
The religious discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act allow most employers to dispense with the majority of pos-
sible religious accommodations for pharmacists who refuse to 
fill prescriptions on religious grounds. Those provisions are 
meaningless, however, if employers are reluctant to assert Title 
VII’s protections against accommodations imposing an undue 
hardship on the pharmacy’s business operations. As pharma-
cies negotiate the tensions between consumers demanding 
prompt access to prescription drugs, a tight labor market for 
pharmacists, pressure from certain religious groups to discour-
age the use of birth control, vocal national groups advocating 
expanded access to contraception, and their own economic bot-
 
 226. See Fairbank, supra note 159 (“Last year, a Dallas pharmacist refused 
to fill a child’s prescription for Ritalin.”). 
 227. See Talk of the Nation: Pharmacists and Contraceptive Prescriptions 
(National Public Radio broadcast Apr. 7, 2005) (quoting a listener e-mail). 
 228. See Sanchez, supra note 11 (“[Sarah] Stoesz, [president] of Planned 
Parenthood [of Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota] said she fears 
that sentiment could prompt pharmacists to deny other prescription medica-
tions, such as AIDS drugs.”). 
 229. See Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Faith-Based 
Pharmacies?: Religious Right Backs Prescription Exemptions, CHURCH & ST., 
May 2005, at 18, 18, available at http://www.au.org/site/News2?page= 
NewsArticle&id=7369&abbr=cs (“Pharmacists for Life International . . . advo-
cates refusing to fill prescriptions for people whose lifestyles offend fundamen-
talist religious proclivities.”); see also Stein, supra note 179 (noting that some 
states are considering legislation to shield health workers from repercussions 
for refusing to treat gay and lesbian clients). 
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tom line, Title VII can serve either as an answer or as an ex-
cuse. Employers may use Title VII as a pretense to justify un-
necessary accommodations for objecting pharmacists; pharma-
cies may attempt to use federal law to shield themselves from 
customer and activist criticism by asserting that they have no 
choice but to accommodate. On the other hand, pharmacies can 
utilize Title VII as a tool to define the outer limits of their 
pharmacist accommodation policies. A clear understanding of 
the parameters of Title VII’s religious accommodation require-
ments will help guide and monitor the behavior and legal justi-
fications presented by employers, employees, and customers 
when pharmacists refuse to dispense certain drugs on religious 
grounds. 
